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Abstract
For many decades, like many developed countries, Turkey has controlled her 
electricity sector as a state-owned monopoly. However, faced with rapid 
electricity demand growth, Turkey started to consider nuclear option. The 
present paper aims at evaluating both the present status of nuclear power in 
general and its implications for Turkish energy market in particular. After 
examining existing nuclear power technology and providing a brief overview 
of nuclear power economics; it focuses on the repercussions of nuclear 
power for Turkish energy market. The paper concludes that, in the short run, 
it may be considered to keep nuclear power within Turkish energy mix 
because it is an important carbon-free source of power that can potentially 
make a significant contribution to both Turkey’s future electricity supply and
efforts to strengthen Turkey’s security of supply. However, in the long term, 
nuclear power should be retained in Turkey only if it has a lower cost than 
competing technologies.
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21. Introduction
The Republic of Turkey (thereafter Turkey) is located between 
Europe1 and Asia, bordering the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Seas. 
Turkish economy, the world's 16th largest economy, is a dynamic and 
emerging one (Ozturk et al., 2005). In 2004, Gross National Product (GNP) 
was realized as 269 billion USD, which corresponds to 3,750 USD per capita. 
In 2004, annual GDP growth rate was 8.9%. Population of Turkey is about 
71.7 million and the population growth rate is 1.4% (World Bank, 2006). The 
economy has undergone a significant shift away from agriculture towards the 
industrial and especially the services sector in the last three decades, 
although 29% of the active population is still employed in agriculture
(Turkstat, 2006). The net effect of all these factors is that Turkey's energy
demand has grown rapidly almost every year and is expected to continue 
growing. 
With an average final electricity consumption growth rate of 8.3% per 
annum over the 1973-2002 period, Turkey is among the fastest growing 
energy markets in the world2 (IEA, 2004, p. II.624). The government expects 
demand growth to accelerate in the coming decades with an average annual 
growth rate between 6.3% - 8.4% (see Table 1)3.
[ Table 1 goes here ]
                                                
1 In October 2005, accession negotiations are opened with Turkey, who has been an 
associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. For a more 
detailed discussion of EU-Turkey relations, see Erdogdu (2002).
2 During the same period, on average, final electricity consumption increased by only 2.9% 
annually in OECD countries, which corresponds to about 1/3 of the figure for Turkey (IEA, 
2004, p. I.46).
3 However, official projections highly overestimate the electricity demand in Turkey. For more 
information on Turkish electricity demand, see Erdogdu (2006b).
3In short, it is obvious that electricity consumption in Turkey is growing 
very rapidly. To cope with the expected increase in electricity consumption,
there exist some options, among which one of the most controversial is 
nuclear.
Stimulated by the urgency of the Second World War, nuclear science 
progressed rapidly from the discovery of the neutron by Sir James Chadwick 
in 1932. The first controlled chain reaction took place in 1943, the first atomic 
weapon was developed in 1945, and in 1951 electricity is produced using 
nuclear energy for the first time. Following its first application for generating 
electricity in the United States, nuclear energy began to be applied to the 
production of electricity in the United Kingdom (1953), Russia (1954), France 
(1956), and Germany (1961); that is, five countries within the first decade. 
Ten more countries began nuclear-based generation in the 1960s followed 
by another ten in the 1970s. The oil crisis of the early 1970s provoked a 
surge in nuclear power plant orders and construction. Later that decade, the 
world economic slowdown combined with the declining price of fossil fuels 
curtailed the growth of nuclear energy demand. As this took effect, two 
accidents, at Three Mile Island in the United States (1979) and at Chernobyl 
in the former Soviet Union (1986), raised serious questions in the public mind 
about nuclear safety. The overall effect was a significant slowing of nuclear 
energy's growth in the 1990s. Nevertheless, some countries continued to 
push ahead strongly with reactor construction, thus contributing to small 
increases in nuclear electricity production (OECD, 2003). Today, there are 
441 nuclear reactors in operation worldwide, with an additional 35 under 
4construction. Nuclear power provides about 17% of the world's electricity
(Duffy, 2004). To put it shortly, the 50-year history of commercial nuclear 
power has been punctuated by dramatic policy changes. The first 20 years, 
marked by limited public participation, tight government control, and promises 
of clean, abundant energy, were followed by a period of intense social and 
political conflict over the technology's environmental and safety implications. 
Nuclear policy in the United States and most European nations shifted from 
all-out support to a more ambivalent posture, which led to a dramatic 
slowdown in the construction of new plants. 
For many decades, like many developed countries, Turkey has 
controlled her electricity sector as a state-owned monopoly. However, faced 
with rapid electricity demand growth, Turkey started to consider nuclear 
option4. The present paper aims at evaluating both the present status of 
nuclear power in general (including existing nuclear technology, nuclear 
power economics and current status of nuclear power in the world) and its 
implications for Turkish energy market in particular. Following part of the
article provides a brief overview of nuclear power economics. Next part not 
only sets out the development and current context of nuclear power in the 
world but also focuses on its repercussions for the open energy markets. 
Fourth part considers both the historical background and current status of 
nuclear power in Turkey. Energy policymakers and others whose main 
interest is in nuclear-related policy matters may wish to concentrate on the 
final part.
                                                
4 Actually, in the first place, Turkey has initiated a comprehensive energy market 
liberalization process to cope with rapid energy demand growth. For more information on 
Turkish energy market reform process, see Erdogdu (2006a).
52.1. Costs of Nuclear Power
Figure 1 shows the life cycle revenues and costs for a typical nuclear 
power plant. It demonstrates the factors that characterize the economics of 
nuclear energy, that is;
 high capital investment costs;
 long planning horizons5 and operational life;
 low fuel, operating and maintenance (O&M) costs;
 significant costs incurred after cessation of power generation (notably 
management and disposal of radioactive waste and
decommissioning).
[ Figure 1 goes here ]
Nuclear power's cost structure makes it well-suited for baseload power
generation6, since it has a high fraction of fixed capital costs and a low 
fraction of variable operating costs7.
                                                
5 Although the construction times of nuclear power plants have been sometimes rather long 
in the past, many recent nuclear power plants were constructed and put into service within 
no more than four years.
6 That is, nuclear power plants should be operated at almost full capacity whenever they 
operate.
7 A baseload power plant is one that is operated continuously. The fixed costs per kWh 
energy produced declines rapidly as time passes in such a plant. Even, in the long run, they 
disappear as the plant pays itself back. Also, in this kind of plants, operating costs needs to 
be low; otherwise, the total cost of production increases enormously as it operates 
constantly. So, from the perspective of commercial economics, a power plant is well suited 
for baseload power generation if it has a high fraction of fixed construction costs and a low 
fraction of variable operating costs.
62.1.1 Operating Costs of Nuclear Power
Operating costs of nuclear power has two main components: operation 
and maintenance (O&M) costs and fuel costs.
O&M costs include all costs that are not considered capital or fuel 
costs, the main elements being the costs of operating and support staff, 
training, security, health and safety, and management and disposal of 
operational waste.
Fuel costs include costs related to the fuel cycle, including the costs of 
purchasing, converting and enriching uranium, fuel fabrication, spent fuel 
conditioning, reprocessing, disposal of the spent fuel or the high-level waste 
resulting from reprocessing and transport. Fuel costs make up only about 
20% of the costs of nuclear-generated electricity, which is therefore relatively 
insensitive to fuel price fluctuations - in contrast to the position of fossil fuels
(OECD, 2003).
2.1.2. Capital Costs of Nuclear Power
The capital costs include those of design and construction, major 
refurbishing, decommissioning and high-level waste disposal. The last two 
comprises all the costs incurred from the shutdown of the plant until the site 
is released.
7Not including interest paid during construction, current designs of 
nuclear plants have capital costs of roughly $2000/kW (compared to 
$1200/kW for coal-fired plants and $500/kW for combined-cycle gas 
turbines). Capital costs typically account for 60% to 75% of nuclear power's 
total generation cost, while in coal plants they are only about 50% and in gas-
fired plants they can be 25% or less (OECD, 2001).
Investment costs must be financed, and they thus incur interest 
charges. These are amortized over some set period, perhaps on the order of 
20-25 years, and the debt service8 becomes part of the costs of electricity 
generation. Due to interest charges, delays in construction and 
commissioning can increase the capital cost significantly. If plant construction 
is financed with foreign loans, currency devaluation would also increase 
costs in the country where the plant is installed.
Provisions are also required to be set aside or paid by plant operators 
for decommissioning and high-level waste disposal, a process that can take 
many decades. Decommissioning and waste management liabilities may be 
the most important of the various economic risks of nuclear power in 
competitive electricity markets.
Although decommissioning costs are not spent until after the nuclear 
power plant has been retired, once nuclear fuel has been loaded into the 
reactor and the reactor experiences a self-sustaining nuclear reaction, 
                                                
8 Debt service refers to the cash required over a given period for the repayment of interest 
and principal on a debt.
8regulatory authorities in general require that the owner-operator set aside 
funds to pay for the decommissioning9. 
Funding for spent fuel and high-level waste disposal is somewhat 
similar to that for decommissioning. In many cases, a levy for the cost of 
nuclear spent fuel and/or high-level waste disposal is taken into account in 
nuclear fuel costs. However, most countries have not yet fully implemented 
spent fuel and high-level waste disposal policies. Some countries require 
nuclear generators to contribute to a fund for implementing the waste 
disposal policy that will ultimately be adopted. A critical consequence of not 
having a policy is that a range of uncertainties remain on the cost for waste 
disposal. This large potential liability stands as a strong deterrent to future 
private capital investment in nuclear power as financial institutions will not 
invest in operations that have undefined and unsecured liabilities of such 
potential magnitude.
2.2. Financial Risks of Nuclear Power
A decision to build or to continue to operate a nuclear power plant 
represents greater commercial risk than is normally associated with 
alternative energy sources, for such reasons as (OECD, 2003):
                                                
9 Because of the wide variety of cost estimates, the cost of decommissioning is assumed to 
be one-third of the direct construction cost, discounted 40 years to the start of operations 
(Rothwell, 2004). To cover this cost, some countries require an initial endowment and annual 
contributions from nuclear generators, usually assessed as a fixed amount per kWh of 
generation, while others require nuclear generators to include funding for decommissioning 
costs in their financial plans. In many countries a separate fund, managed by the 
government or by power generators, has been established to cover decommissioning costs.
9 The long planning timescale and operational life provides greater 
potential for long-term changes in the market to impact revenues 
negatively or positively.
 The high fixed-cost element, due largely to the high investment costs, 
produces greater vulnerability to short-term fluctuations in market 
conditions.
 The strong regulatory framework reduces operational flexibility and 
introduces the possibility of changes in regulatory requirements that 
could impact adversely on costs (and historically have done so).
 Uncertainties exist associated with the costs of decommissioning and 
long-lived waste disposal, including the time periods involved.
 Whereas non-nuclear plants can trade or sell much of their cost base 
under negative economic conditions, this is in practice largely ruled 
out for nuclear power plants (e.g. a gas-fired power plant can sell its 
gas supply on the open market).
2.3 Externalities
Commercial economic evaluations do not include externalities. By 
definition, externalities are costs and benefits that are not incorporated in 
market decisions unless governments take specific policy actions. In the 
context of nuclear power, externalities mainly refer to the cost of nuclear 
power’s contribution to sustainable development and the security of energy 
supply.
10
The question of the sustainability of different energy sources is likely to 
assume greater significance; and in this context, nuclear energy has certain 
advantages in its carbon-free generation of electricity and heat, as well as in 
security of supply.
In the long term, the competitive margin of nuclear power significantly 
increases if the external costs, which presently are not included in market 
electricity prices, are taken into account.
2.3.1. Sustainable Development
Today the concept of sustainable development10 is widely accepted 
and the need to integrate economic, environmental and social aspects within 
development policies is progressively recognized in many developed 
countries.
Nuclear energy already contributes to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. At present, if nuclear power plants were replaced by modern 
fossil-fuelled power plants, carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity 
sector would increase by more than 15% (OECD, 2000).
Nuclear power is one of the few energy sources that emit virtually no 
air-polluting or greenhouse gases. The entire nuclear fuel cycle including 
mining of ore and the construction of power plants has been estimated to 
emit between 2.5 and 6 grams of carbon equivalent per kWh of energy 
                                                
10 The concept of sustainable development was elaborated in the late 1980s and defined by 
the Bruntland Report as "a development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".
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produced. This is roughly equal to the estimated releases from the use of 
renewable sources (wind, hydro and solar power) and about 20-75 times less 
than the emissions from natural gas power sources, the cleanest fossil fuel 
available (OECD, 2003). Nuclear power is thus one of the prime means 
available for limiting the emission of carbon into the environment. Figure 2
presents the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation by 
different sources.
[ Figure 2 goes here ]
2.3.2. Security of Supply
As a nation's dependency on foreign sources for its energy increases, 
so do the costs and economic consequences of any disruption. Any energy 
source that reduces dependence on external fuel sources can be said to 
enhance the security of energy supplies and ultimately the security of the 
nation. Security has always been one of the main aims of energy policy in 
almost all countries.
In this framework, nuclear energy can be seen to have two potential 
positive influences. First, importing relatively small amounts of uranium would 
be more attractive than importing relatively large amounts of coal, oil or gas. 
Fuel costs are a major component in the price of fossil fuel electricity. Hence 
the tendency towards fluctuations in fossil fuel prices translates itself into 
variations in the price of electricity, especially in a competitive market. The 
low share of fuel costs and high share of fixed costs in the case of nuclear 
12
electricity generation have, by contrast, a potentially stabilizing effect on 
electricity costs and prices. Second, Uranium resources are abundant and 
spread in several world regions11. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear fuel and fuel 
feedstock are compact and easy to stockpile; large inventories can be kept at 
comparatively low cost. About 25 tonnes of fuel assemblies will provide a 
year's fuel for a 1 GW current generation pressurized water reactor. A coal-
fired plant of similar output would require 3 million tonnes of fuel, i.e. more 
than 100,000 times as much (OECD, 2003).
3. Overview of Nuclear Power in the World
3.1. Present Status of Nuclear Power in the World
As presented by Figure 3, nuclear energy increased its share of world 
electricity generation from 3.3% in 1973 to 17.1% in 2001. So far, 32 
countries have produced electricity from nuclear reactors. As of 1 January 
2003, there were 441 commercially operating nuclear reactors (see Table 2) 
representing an installed generating capacity of about 356 Gigawatts (GW) 
net supplying about 7% of the world's total energy and about 17% of the 
world's electricity (OECD, 2003).
[ Figure 3 goes here ]
[ Table 2 goes here ]
                                                
11 On the other hand, oil and gas have a fairly limited geographical availability, with Middle 
Eastern countries and the Russian Federation controlling over 70% of world crude oil 
reserves and about two-thirds of natural gas reserves. Quite aside from the political 
instability that has sometimes characterized the oil and gas supplier regions, the long supply 
routes to major markets are also vulnerable to disruption by political action (OECD, 2003).
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A number of countries have chosen to forego the nuclear option, 
especially in the post-Chernobyl era: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Italy, 
Ireland, and Norway. Sweden continues to operate its 11 nuclear reactors (1 
was closed in 1999) and has extended the 2010 date calling for the shutdown 
of all plants due to a 1980 national referendum, but it continues its policy of 
phasing out nuclear power. Germany, an early enthusiast for nuclear energy, 
passed legislation in 1998 for the eventual phase out of nuclear power but 
subsequently modified the policy in 2001 to limit the operational lives of 
existing plants to 32 years, thereby deferring any immediate closures. On the 
other hand; some countries such as France, Japan, South Korea China, 
Taiwan, India and Pakistan have ordered new nuclear capacity in the last two 
decades (Rosa and Rice, 2004).
3.2. Nuclear Power in Open Energy Markets
There has been a growing recent trend towards opening electricity 
markets to competitive supply and pricing. While there are few doubts that 
economic deregulation will improve the overall economic effectiveness of 
electricity production, its impact on nuclear power is a matter for discussion. 
One consequence of market liberalization is that generating companies no 
longer have a guaranteed market and must examine more carefully the costs 
and anticipated revenues from the sale of electricity.
In general, it is argued that competitive markets favor short-term 
investments with high returns and low risks. Two observations are often 
14
made to support these views: the first is that introducing competition creates 
a state of investment uncertainty; and the second observation is that 
investors in electricity generating plants have shown a strong preference for 
gas-fired combined cycle power plants as these plants have short 
development times and low capital costs. However, there exists a decisive 
difference between transitional uncertainties as competition is introduced and 
market behavior when market conditions have stabilized. It is true that, during 
a transition to competition, investors tend to focus on short-term investments 
with low risks because long-term market conditions may not be clear; but this 
trend may be reversed when transition is completed. Also, at present, it is 
true that decreasing real price of natural gas, combined with steadily 
improving combined-cycle generation (CCGT) technology, has made natural 
gas the cheapest option for baseload power generation in regions with 
pipelines to access natural gas; however, the trend towards the construction 
of CCGTs may also be reversed if the price of gas increases.
Under competition, investment decisions for new nuclear power plants 
will depend ultimately upon their profitability. The prospects for building new 
nuclear power plants in competitive markets are not clear. Although some 
arguments can be made for and against building new nuclear power plants in 
these markets, decisions in many countries are likely to be influenced by 
public opinion, political will, and the pace of implementation of spent fuel and 
other high-level waste disposal facilities.
An OECD/NEA study on Nuclear Power in Competitive Electricity 
Markets, published in 2000, found that nuclear power plants in Finland, 
15
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United States and the United 
Kingdom had been competitive in their respective deregulated markets
(OECD, 2003). Based on current production costs and the trend of 
performance improvement in many countries, a large number of existing 
nuclear power plants are expected to be able to compete well with other 
power technologies in competitive electricity markets (OECD, 2000). Also, 
Nuclear power plants in Finland12 and Sweden have been operating 
successfully within the Nordic electricity market, and Spanish, German and 
Dutch nuclear power plants have successfully competed in the competitive 
markets that were introduced at the beginning of 1998 (OECD, 2003). During 
the past year, there has been increasing publicity about an apparent 
international revival in nuclear ordering. In July 2005, there were 24 plants 
under construction worldwide, with a capacity of 19GW (Herring, 2004).
3.3. Nuclear Fuel Supply
Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear fuel must be specially processed and 
placed into engineered fuel assemblies before it can be used in power plants. 
The raw energy commodity for nuclear power production is natural uranium. 
In its commercial form it is called uranium oxide, or yellowcake. There is no 
other major civilian use for uranium apart from electricity production. 
Therefore, uranium mining activity and uranium prices depend substantially 
on nuclear power generation.
                                                
12 The decision of Finland's TVO (Teollisuuden Voima Oy) company, a large electricity co-
operative, to proceed with the investment in a nuclear plant is the first by a company in a 
competitive electricity market (Andersson and Haden, 1997).
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Uranium is widely dispersed in the earth's crust and in the oceans. At 
the beginning of 2001, estimated conventional uranium resources (known 
and undiscovered) totaled above 16 million tonnes or nearly 250 years of 
supply at the prevailing rate of usage (OECD, 2003). Uranium was mined in 
23 countries in 2001. Canada and Australia provided more than half of the 
world's supply in the same year (see Table 3). In terms of uranium 
conversion and enrichment, US, Russia and France controls about 90% of 
the world capacity (see Table 4).
[ Table 3 goes here ]
[ Table 4 goes here ]
Other advanced techniques currently envisaged (but not developed so 
far) could employ thorium as a fuel feedstock rather than uranium, thereby 
further expanding nuclear fuel resources. India, in particular, with large 
thorium reserves, is working to implement a thorium fuel cycle. In essence, 
nuclear energy cannot be considered to be resource-limited.
3.4. Non-proliferation
Perhaps the most sensitive issue in the early years of the 21st century 
is nuclear proliferation and the related concern of nuclear terrorism. The 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have pushed nuclear power into the 
spotlight and revealed loopholes in the current international agreements and 
their enforcement mechanisms. It also made it obvious that the major 
17
challenge nuclear energy is facing today is to provide an impermeable 
solution for managing the nuclear fuel cycle in order to prevent proliferation 
and to eliminate the risk of misusing nuclear material. The risk of weapons 
proliferation will remain an issue for nuclear energy and an important concern 
for the public as long as the link between civilian and military use of nuclear 
energy cannot be effectively and permanently cut.
Today, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)13 - an independent 
intergovernmental science- and technology-based organization within the 
United Nations family - serves as the global focal point for nuclear 
cooperation. IAEA has played a vital role in international nuclear security and 
a minor role, if any, in the development and application of nuclear power. As 
a universal organization, it is used by Western countries for purposes of 
controlling “nuclear risk” in the developing countries. It has to coexist with 
other specialized nuclear agencies such as Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of 
OECD, and the EU's special nuclear agency. The IAEA has no direct 
regulatory powers but has a major, if not the most dominant, influence on 
regulation by national agencies with direct regulatory powers. Therefore, in 
practice, it acts as a global nuclear regulatory agency. Today, its main task is 
to safeguard the use of nuclear materials and facilities not only in member 
countries under the Non-Proliferation Treaty14 (NPT) but also in non-NPT 
countries.
                                                
13 The IAEA was established by treaty, effective in 1957.
14 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 is the fundamental legal basis for the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT divides the world into two groups -
States that had nuclear weapons when the Treaty came into place (that is, 1970), or the 
"nuclear weapon States" which included China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States; and the remainder of the signatories called the "non-nuclear weapon States". 
As of 2006, there are 188 signatories of the treaty. Each nuclear weapon State pledged not 
to transfer nuclear weapons, not to assist any non-nuclear weapon State to develop nuclear 
18
3.5. Future of Nuclear Power
Nuclear power is important, but its future is uncertain. The outlook for 
nuclear power is affected by many factors. Commercial economics is a key 
factor. Governments are liberalizing their energy markets, increasing the 
importance of cost-effectiveness for all electricity generation sources. The 
long-term future for nuclear power, like that for other energy sources, will 
increasingly be based upon its cost-effectiveness. However, commercial 
economics is far from being the only key factor. The wider energy policy 
framework remains a vital consideration for future decisions on nuclear 
power.
The list of worries related to nuclear energy comprises economic 
performance, proliferation of dangerous material, the threat of terrorism, 
operation safety, radioactive waste disposal, and, as a result of all these, 
public acceptance. The resolution of these concerns will be a complex social 
process involving relatively clear-cut technical, technological, and economic 
factors as well as particularly contentious social and political choices. The 
outcome of this process will determine the role nuclear might play in the 
world energy balance in the long-term future.
The future of nuclear energy depends on the interplay between five
factors:
                                                                                                                                         
weapons and to work to achieve nuclear disarmament. India, Israel and Pakistan have so far 
refused to sign the NPT.
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1. Growth in energy demand, 
2. Cost-competitiveness with other fuel sources, 
3. Environmental15 and security of supply considerations, 
4. Concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
5. Questions of public attitude and perception.
Depending on the satisfactory resolution of these factors, many new 
and enlarged applications of nuclear energy can be envisaged. 
4. Nuclear Power in Turkish Energy Market
4.1. History of Turkish Electricity Market
Hepbasli (2005) reports that in Turkey “the first electric generator was 
a 2 kW dynamo connected to the water mill installed in Tarsus” in 1902; and, 
he continues, “[t]he first bigger power plant was installed in Silahtaraga, 
Istanbul, in 1913”. The following evolution of Turkish energy market may be 
summarized as follows.
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, and until the 1930s the 
electricity industry was heavily dependent on foreign investment as the 
country was trying a liberal economy. In the 1930s, there was a widespread 
belief all over the world in the benefits of public ownership of the electricity 
industry. Following this trend, nationalization of Turkish electricity industry 
                                                
15 Nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases, therefore, the competitiveness of nuclear 
power will significantly improve if the external environmental costs are reasonably reflected 
in market prices, e.g. through a carbon dioxide tax.
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started in 1938 and, by 1944, almost all electricity industry had been placed 
within the public domain.
In the 1960s, the government started the “development plans era”. 
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) was established in 
1963, and was responsible for Turkey’s energy policy. This was followed in 
1970 by the creation of Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK), which would 
have a monopoly in the Turkish electricity sector at almost all stages apart 
from distribution, which were left to the local administrations16.
In the early 1980s, as was the case in many European countries, the 
Turkish electricity industry was dominated by a state-owned vertically 
integrated company, TEK. Starting from the 1980s, the government sought to 
attract private participation into the industry in order to ease the investment 
burden on the general budget. In 1982, the monopoly of public sector on 
generation was abolished and the private sector was allowed to build power 
plants and sell their electricity to TEK. In 1984, TEK was restructured and 
gained the status of state-owned enterprise. 
Various private sector participation models short of privatization were 
put into practice. The first law setting up a framework for private participation 
in electricity industry was enacted in 1984 (Law No. 3096). This Law forms 
the legal basis for private participation through Build Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) contracts for new generation facilities, Transfer of Operating Rights 
(TOOR) contracts for existing generation and distribution assets, and the 
                                                
16 In 1982, however, distribution was also transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national 
vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state.
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autoproducer system for companies to produce their own electricity. Under a 
BOT concession, a private company would build and operate a plant for up to 
99 years (subsequently reduced to 49 years) and then transfer it to the state 
at no cost. Under a TOOR, the private enterprise would operate (and 
rehabilitate where necessary) an existing government-owned facility through 
a lease-type arrangement (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003).
In 1993, TEK was incorporated into privatization plan and split into two 
separate state-owned enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity Generation 
Transmission Co. (TEAS) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Co. (TEDAS). 
However, the constitutional court of Turkey issued a series of rulings in 1994 
and 1995 making the privatization almost impossible to implement in 
electricity industry. To overcome the deadlock; in August 1999, the 
parliament passed a constitutional amendment permitting the privatization of 
public utility services and allowing international arbitration for resolving 
disputes. However, during this interval, Turkey not only lost five invaluable 
years in terms of reform process that could never get back but also, and 
more importantly, tried to enhance the attractiveness of BOT projects by 
providing “take or pay” guarantees by the Undersecretariat of Treasury for 
adding new generation capacity to meet anticipated demand. An additional 
law, namely the Build Operate and Own17 (BOO) Law (No. 4283), for private 
sector participation in the construction and operation of new power plants 
was also enacted in 1997 again with guarantees provided by the Treasury18. 
                                                
17 Under the BOO model, investors retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract 
period. That is, it is a kind of licensing system rather than a concession award.
18 A typical BOT, BOO or TOOR generation contract, signed between the private party and 
TEAS or TEDAS, includes exclusive “take or pay” obligations with fixed quantities (in 
general, 85% of the plant output) and prices (or price formulas) over 15-30 years. That is, 
under these models, the government retains most commercial risks while providing the 
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Current structure of the contracts concluded based on these laws acts as a 
major barrier to the development of competition in the electricity sector.
On 3 March 2001, Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into 
force and aimed at establishing a financially strong, stable, transparent and 
competitive electricity market. In line with new law, TEAS was restructured to 
form three new state-owned public enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity 
Transmission Co. (TEIAS), Electricity Generation Co. (EUAS) and Turkish 
Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. (TETAS). The new law also created 
an autonomous regulatory body, namely Electricity Market Regulatory 
Authority. 
Along the lines of developments in electricity sector, some other 
reforms were also introduced in other segments of the energy industry. On 2 
May 2001, Natural Gas Market Law (NGML, No. 4646) also came into force 
and aimed at achieving similar objectives in natural gas market. It also 
renamed the regulatory body as Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA). As a final step, Petroleum Market Law (PML, No. 5015) and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Market Law (LPGML, No.5307) came into force on 
20 December 2003 and 13 March 2005 respectively and EMRA was granted 
the responsibility to regulate these markets as well19.
                                                                                                                                         
private sector with substantial rewards. Also the situation was worse in Turkey as, in Turkish 
case; there was no requirement for prequalification or even for a competitive open tender to 
conclude these contracts (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003), which resulted in onerous terms and high 
electricity prices.
19 For a detailed discussion of the Turkish energy market reforms, see Erdogdu (2005, 
2006a).
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4.2. Current Market Structure
In generation, state-owned generation company (EUAS) and its 
affiliated partnerships were responsible for 41.6% of total generation in 2004. 
Power plants under autoproducer system accounted for 15.8% of total 
production in the same year. Those under BOT and BOO contracts also 
supplied another 33.8%. Table 5 presents the distribution of electricity 
generation by utilities in Turkish electricity market.
[ Table 5 goes here ]
In terms of installed capacity, EUAS is again in a dominant position 
and controlled 54.6% of total installed capacity in 2004. Power plants under 
autoproducer system and BOT and BOO contracts accounted for 11.9% and 
23% of installed capacity respectively in the same year. Table 6 shows the 
breakdown of Turkey’s installed capacity by utilities in 2004. 
[ Table 6 goes here ]
State-owned distribution company (TEDAS) and its affiliated regional 
distribution companies dominate the distribution and retail supply sector. 
Turkey’s distribution network has been divided into 21 regions, one of which 
is currently operating under a TOOR contract. The government’s objective is 
to privatize the remaining 20 distribution regions by the end of 2006 (IEA, 
2005).
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As for the shares of primary energy resources in Turkey's gross 
electricity generation (see Table 7), natural gas has the highest share 
(41.3%) followed by hydro power (30.6), coal (22.8%), oil and naphta (5%) 
and renewables and wastes (0.3%).
[ Table 7 goes here ]
Turkey's rapid growth in electricity demand, which has led to almost a 
doubling of installed generating capacity over the past decade, is expected to 
continue for the foreseeable future. This could lead to building a total 
installed generating capacity of as much as 65,000 MW by 2010. MENR 
believes that this would require an investment of $3-5 billion/year (Tunc et al., 
2005). Recently, TEIAS published new official demand projections up to 2015 
based on two different scenarios. The government expects electricity 
demand to increase from 160.8 TWh in 2005 to 297.1 - 354.3 TWh in 2015 
with an average annual growth rate of 6.3 - 8.4% (see Table 1).
4.3. Turkish Nuclear Energy Policy
Studies to build a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Turkey were started in 
1965. Later, between 1967 and 1970, a feasibility study was undertaken by a 
foreign consultant company to build a 300-400 MW nuclear power plant. The 
nuclear power plant would have been in operation in 1977. Unfortunately, 
because of the problems relating to site selection and other issues, the 
project could not come to fruition.
25
In 1973, TEK decided to build an 80 MW prototype plant. However, in 
1974 the project was cancelled for the reason that this project could delay the 
construction of a greater capacity nuclear power plant. Instead of this 
prototype plant, TEK had decided to build a 600 MW NPP in southern 
Turkey.
Site selection studies were made in 1974 and 1975 and Akkuyu 
(Mersin) in southern Turkey was found suitable for the construction of the first 
nuclear power plant. In 1976, the Atomic Energy Commission granted a site 
license for Akkuyu. In 1977, a bid was prepared and two companies were 
awarded the contract as the best bidders. Contract negotiations continued 
until 1980. However, in September 1980, due to the Swedish government's 
decision to withdraw a loan guarantee, the project was cancelled.
The third attempt was made in 1980. Three companies were awarded 
the contract to build four nuclear power plants. Due to Turkey's request to 
apply the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) model, two of the firms resigned from 
the bid. Although one firm accepted the BOT model, it insisted upon a 
governmental guarantee on the BOT credit. The Turkish government refused 
to give the guarantee and as a consequence the project was cancelled.
In 1992, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources stated in a 
report submitted to the government that without the installation of new energy 
resources before 2010, the country would face an energy crisis, suggesting 
that nuclear energy generation should be considered as an option.
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In 1993, the High Council of Science and Technology identified 
nuclear electricity generation as the third highest priority project for the 
country. In view of this decision, the Turkish Electricity Generation and 
Transmission Company (TEAS) included a nuclear power plant project in its 
1993 investment programme. The bid process started in 1996. Three 
consortiums offered proposals in 1997. After a series of delays, in July 2000, 
the entire nuclear programme was postponed indefinitely until economic 
conditions improve.
After 2001, the nuclear option has again started to be considered 
within the future alternative energy sources to reduce security of supply risks 
caused by the dominance of imported fuels and to ensure diversity in power 
generation (IEA, 2005). In 2004, the nuclear programme was revived by the 
MENR and studies were launched for a long-term and comprehensive 
nuclear power programme. At the end of 2005 the government again 
announced that it wanted to have at least three nuclear power stations with a 
capacity of 5.000 MW in operation by 2012. This date quickly seemed too 
ambitious for even the energy minister and he announced on 3 January 2006 
that the launch of nuclear power would instead take place in 2015 (NEA,
2006).
In summary, today, despite several attempts in the past to build 
nuclear power plants, there is no nuclear power plant in operation or under 
construction in Turkey20. 
                                                
20 A nuclear research reactor has been operating in Istanbul since 1962.
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Founded in 1982, in Turkey, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority 
(TAEK) is in charge of all regulatory activities in the nuclear field, including 
nuclear and radiation safety, site selection, construction, operation and 
decommissioning of nuclear installations and other activities involving nuclear 
or radioactive materials. It issues regulations and licences and conducts 
inspections. TAEK also conducts nuclear R&D.
While Turkey currently has surplus capacity, demand is growing 
quickly and the government expects it to exceed supply, potentially by 2009. 
Since 2001, publicly-owned generators have not been allowed to make 
investments in new power plants. Simultaneously, private projects have 
started, but there are some concerns that private investors find it difficult to 
compete with fully depreciated state-owned power plants. Therefore, Turkey 
has recently announced that it will reopen its nuclear programme in order to 
respond to the growing electricity demand while avoiding increasing 
dependence on energy imports.
As for economics of nuclear power in Turkey, it is expected that the 
capital cost of a PWR21 type nuclear power plant will range between 1.9 - 2.5 
US cents/kWh in Turkey depending on finance method adapted, while its 
operating cost will be around 1.3 US cents/kWh. Table 8 presents the power 
generating costs by different energy sources.
[ Table 8 goes here ]
                                                
21 Pressurised water reactor is the most common type of light water reactor (LWR), it uses 
water at very high pressure in a primary circuit and steam is formed in a secondary circuit.
28
5. Policy Suggestions and Conclusion
Having reviewed the technical and economic aspects of nuclear power
both in the world and in Turkey let me list some policy guidelines for energy 
policymakers or for anyone with an interest in nuclear-related policy matters.
First of all, all necessary steps should be taken to create a platform in 
which everyone with a nuclear interest may express his/her ideas with a view 
to reaching a consensus. That is, nuclear power development process should 
not rely upon purely administrative decisions, taken without public debate. 
Otherwise, its destiny may turn out to be that of general energy market 
reform process in Turkey22, which is “uncertainty” and “deadlock”.
Second, so far, Turkey has deeply experienced the tragic effects of 
public investments or private investments with treasury guarantees in energy 
sector. Therefore, the planned nuclear power plants should be owned and 
operated by private investors without treasury guarantees23. Also, private 
ownership of nuclear power plants (with 5.000 MW installed capacity) will 
contribute to the development of competitive electricity market by increasing 
the share of IPPs in installed capacity from 2.1% to 13.8%. On the other 
hand, if the planned nuclear power plants are operated by state-owned 
EUAS, the share of government in installed capacity will increase to 60%, 
meaning effectively the end of energy market liberalization process in Turkey. 
                                                
22 For a detailed discussion of the Turkish energy market reforms, see Erdogdu (2005, 
2006a).
23 However, some non-governmental guarantees may be provided. For instance, electricity 
distribution companies may be required to buy a specific portion of their electricity needs 
from nuclear generators. 
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Third, Turkey should create a sound legal framework for the use of 
nuclear power. She should clarify the role of nuclear power in the future in 
terms of economic competitiveness.
Fourth, Turkish policymakers should aim at ensuring that the full, 
unsubsidized costs of all forms of power generation (including nuclear) are 
borne by generators. To the extent possible, policymakers should make sure 
that the full costs and benefits of environmental protection are reflected 
through all stages of fuel production, power generation and waste disposal, 
ideally through market pricing mechanisms. On the other hand, they should 
recognize the various effects of externalities (environmental considerations, 
security of supply and so on) from power generation and aim to establish 
procedures that would facilitate their appropriate inclusion in decision-making 
mechanisms. Particular attention should be devoted to evaluation of the 
potential energy security and environmental characteristics of nuclear power. 
If the market mechanism fails to include the value of positive externalities in 
the price signals, the government may consider providing financial support to 
nuclear industry. However, the support should not affect price structure and 
be only in the form of direct cash refunds on clearly defined bases per kWh 
produced, in line with estimated value of externalities.
Fifth, a fully independent nuclear energy regulator should be created 
to provide licences, approve suitable sites and technologies for nuclear 
power plants, inspect all technical issues related to nuclear power plants, and 
update nuclear legislation in these aspects. In this context, TAEK may be 
restructured by dividing it into two bodies, one which will continue nuclear 
30
energy R&D and another which will form an independent nuclear energy 
regulator. In terms of economic regulation, the EMRA should be responsible 
for the economic regulation of nuclear power plants. The quality of the 
persons in the position of regulators (that is, the members of the Energy 
Market Regulatory Board and nuclear energy regulatory board) and their staff 
is a critical issue as it is important for the credibility of EMRA and nuclear 
energy regulator that not only the members of their board but also their staff 
are highly qualified, which requires strict merit selection and performance 
management. Also, it is better to keep in mind that maintaining a stable 
regulatory and political environment is the key to success in nuclear 
regulation.
Sixth, competitive markets require clear definition and quantification of 
all liabilities associated with nuclear power. Therefore, responsibilities for 
nuclear waste management and disposal, including funding, should be 
clearly defined from the outset of launching a nuclear power project. Two 
funds, namely “radioactive waste fund” and “decommissioning fund”, need to 
be created for waste disposal and the eventual decommissioning of the 
nuclear power plants; and both of them should be managed by private parties
that are expert in fund management business, not by bureaucrats. 
Seventh, decisions about new nuclear power plants are likely to be 
strongly influenced by public opinion and political will. The lack of public 
acceptance undermines future possibilities for nuclear power plants. 
Improving the public's technical understanding of nuclear risks and 
enhancing their ability to weigh them against other risks is the key to 
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improving public support for nuclear power. However, portraying the possible 
environmental or health effects of accidents as "zero" or as known with 
certainty to be negligible is not convincing and erodes credibility. It should be 
kept in mind that openness is an essential ingredient to foster public trust in 
nuclear power. Therefore, Turkey should eliminate its "culture of secrecy". 
Public confidence also requires trust in the involved institutions, both in the 
regulator and the regulated. This, in turn, also requires transparency and pro-
active communication.
Eight, given current situation24, it seems that Turkey will continue to be 
a "technology taker" for the foreseeable future. Therefore, R&D efforts need 
to focus on the acquisition and adaptation of the best available technology to 
suit the particular Turkish circumstances.
Finally, Turkey should separate civilian nuclear power production from 
military issues to the maximum extent possible and strengthen safeguards to 
prevent misuse of civilian nuclear materials, especially in the form of the 
production of military materials.
In conclusion; despite its maturity, widespread usage and steady 
progress, compared with other energy sources, nuclear energy has a level of 
public concern that makes it unique among energy sources. Many factors 
contribute to this, including its military origins and potential to be applied to 
weapons purposes, technical complexity, the long-term implications of 
nuclear waste, its complicated safety legal and insurance requirements, the 
                                                
24 As compared to GDP, the Turkish state energy R&D budget is one of the smallest 
(together with Portugal) among the IEA member countries (IEA, 2005).
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consequences associated with potential accidents, the health effects of 
exposure to radiation and the large-scale investments required for its 
exploitation. Understanding these issues is vital for any evaluation of nuclear 
power.
I believe the nuclear option should be retained, precisely because it is 
an important carbon-free source of power that can potentially make a 
significant contribution not only to future electricity supply but also to efforts 
to strengthen Turkey’s security of supply. However, no single technology has 
a clear economic advantage in all countries and specific circumstances within 
Turkey will determine the most economic choices. Therefore, in the long run, 
nuclear power should be retained in Turkey only if it has a lower cost than 
competing technologies. This is especially critical as electricity market in 
Turkey becomes progressively less subject to economic regulation.
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Table 1. Official gross electricity demand forecast: 2006–2015
Years
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
GWh Growth (%) GWh Growth (%)
2006 171,430 - 171,430 -
2007 185,830 8.4 182,230 6.3
2008 201,440 8.4 193,711 6.3
2009 218,361 8.4 205,914 6.3
2010 236,703 8.4 218,887 6.3
2011 256,586 8.4 232,677 6.3
2012 278,139 8.4 247,335 6.3
2013 301,503 8.4 262,918 6.3
2014 326,829 8.4 279,481 6.3
2015 354,283 8.4 297,089 6.3
Source: TEIAS (2006a)
Table 2. Major nuclear power producer countries
Nuclear 
Electricity 
Produced 
(2001, 
TWh)
(%)
Number of 
Reactors 
(2003)
(%)
Installed 
Capacity 
(2001, GW)
(%)
Nuclear 
Proportion in 
Total 
Domestic 
Generation 
(2001, %)
US 808 30.4 104 23.6 95 26.7 21
France 421 15.9 59 13.4 63 17.7 77
Japan 320 12.1 54 12.2 44 12.4 31
Germany 171 6.4 19 4.3 21 5.9 30
Russia 138 5.2 30 6.8 21 5.9 15
South Korea 112 4.2 18 4.1 13 3.7 40
UK 90 3.4 33 7.5 12 3.4 23
Canada 77 2.9 14 3.2 14 3.9 13
Ukraine 76 2.9 13 2.9 11 3.1 44
Sweden 72 2.7 11 2.5 9 2.5 45
Rest of the 
World
369 13.9 86 19.5 53 14.9 9
World Total 2654 100.0 441 100.0 356 100.0 17
Sources: Tunc et al. (2005), OECD (2003), Rosa and Rice (2004)
Table 3. World uranium production, 2001
Country Tonne Uranium %
Canada 12,520 35.0
Australia 7,720 21.6
Niger 3,096 8.7
Namibia 2,239 6.3
Uzbekistan 2,400 6.7
Russia (estimated) 2,000 5.6
Kazakhstan 2,018 5.6
United States 1,000 2.8
South Africa 898 2.5
China (estimated) 500 1.4
Ukraine (estimated) 500 1.4
Czech Republic 330 0.9
India (estimated) 200 0.6
France 124 0.3
Romania 115 0.3
Spain 30 0.1
Others 77 0.2
World Total 35,767 100.0
Source: (Herring, 2004)
Table 4. World uranium conversion and enrichment capacities, 1999
Country thousand swu*/year %
US 19,200 34.9
Russia 19,000 34.5
France 10,800 19.6
UK 1,800 3.3
Netherlands 1,500 2.7
Germany 1,100 2.0
Japan 950 1.7
Others 725 1.3
World Total 55,075 100.0
* swu means "separative work unit"
Source: (Herring, 2004)
Table 5. Distribution of gross electricity generation in Turkey by utilities, 2004
Utilities
Production 
(GWh)
Contribution to 
Turkey’s Gross
Generation (%)
EUAS and its affiliated partnerships 62,638.6 41.6
Power plants under BOO model 36,645.5 24.3
Autoproducers 23,758.2 15.8
Power plants under BOT model 14,379.5 9.5
Power plants in the privatization process 5,378.6 3.6
Mobile Power Plants 1,288.0 0.9
Independent power producers (IPPs) 2,674.7 1.8
Power plants under TOOR model 3,935.2 2.6
Total Gross Electricity Generation 150,698.3 100.0
Source: TEIAS (2006b)
Table 6. Breakdown of Turkey’s installed capacity by utilities, 2004
Utilities
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW)
Contribution 
to Turkey’s 
total Installed 
capacity (%)
EUAS and its affiliated partnerships 20,109.6 54.6
Power plants under BOO model 6,101.8 16.6
Autoproducers 4,380.4 11.9
Power plants under BOT model 2,349 6.4
Power plants in the privatization process 1,680 4.6
Mobile Power Plants 780.2 2.1
Independent power producers (IPPs) 772.9 2.1
Power plants under TOOR model 650.1 1.8
Total Installed Capacity 36,824 100.0
Source: TEIAS (2006c)
Table 7. Turkey's gross electricity generation by share of 
primary energy resources, 2004
Energy Resource %
Natural gas* 41.3
Hydro 30.6
Coal 22.8
Oil & Naphta 5.0
Renew. and wastes 0.3
Total 100.0
* Turkey has almost no natural gas reserves.
Source: TEIAS (2006d)
Table 8. Power generating costs in Turkey by different energy sources
Fuel input
Total Cost 
(US cents 
per kWh)
Average hydro 0.16
Geothermal 2.46
Lignite 2.99
Fuel oil 3.14
Nuclear* (min) 3.20
Average thermal (EUAS) 3.56
Nuclear* (max) 3.80
Natural gas 3.86
Hard coal 4.37
Diesel 16.24
* Estimated
Source: IEA (2005), OECD (2000, 2001)
Source: OECD (2003)
Figure 1. Life cycle cash flow for a nuclear power plant
gCeq/kWh: Grams of carbon equivalent per kWh of electricity produced
Source: OECD (2003)
Figure 2. Greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation by different sources
Source: Tunc et al. (2005)
Figure 3. Fuel shares of world electricity generation in 1973 and 2001
